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Abstract: 
In The Political Economy of Progress, Joseph Persky argues for seeing J.S. Mill as a consistent ‘radical’ 
with much to offer modern ‘radical’ political discourse. In this article, I further this claim with 
consideration of Mill's political philosophy, as well as his political economy. Exploring Mill's 
commitment to radical re-ordering of the economy, as well as emphasising his commitment to 
egalitarianism; his historically-nuanced view of ‘the progress of justice’; and his desire for a 
transformation of social (and economic) relations allows us to see more clearly how Mill's 
radicalism was a specific species of socialism. That is, Mill's early radical enthusiasm for the ideals 
of ‘liberty, equality, and fraternity’ are also to be seen in his later socialism. Recognising his 
‘radicalism’ as a species of socialism allows greater understanding of the depth, importance, and 
‘radicalism’ of Mill's desired socialist reforms. 
 
 
 
Joseph Persky’s new book has a two-pronged approach to looking at John Stuart Mill’s radical 
political economy. Firstly, it tries to show to an audience broadly interested in Mill that his 
radicalism is ‘the coherent and compelling product of his utilitarian position’.1 Secondly, it aims to 
persuade ‘modern radicals, who have adopted much of Mill’s concern with equality and justice, 
but have lost his progressive optimism – and especially his optimism with respect to fundamental 
institutional change in people’s work lives’ that Mill is not merely ‘marginally relevant’, but 
‘valuable’.2  
Both goals are important for Mill scholarship (leaving aside the question of modern American 
politics). Firstly because this adds another fruitful pillar to the broadly ‘revisionist’ approach to 
Mill, which rejects the ‘two Mill’s’ thesis (in all its forms), which is still surprisingly – and 
unhelpfully – dominant. Secondly, because in seeing Mill as not only consistent, but consistently 
radical, it helpfully highlights three often-overlooked elements of his philosophy. One, his 
commitment to equality and justice as well as ‘the free development of individuality’3. Two, his 
optimism about improving society, and particularly conditions (very broadly conceived) for 
working people. Three, his associated commitment to radical change, restructuring and 
improvement of people’s working lives. Indeed, as I will argue in this paper, one ought to go 
further than Persky does in this, understanding the translation of Mill’s original Benthamite 
‘philosophical-radicalism’ into a form of socialism which is also potentially valuable to a modern 
audience, being essentially voluntarist, decentralised, organic, and achievable through piecemeal 
reform from within existing capitalist institutions.4 
                                           
1 Joseph Persky, The Political Economy of Progress: John Stuart Mill and Modern Radicalism (Oxford, 2016), p.xi. 
2 Persky, Political Economy, p.xi. 
3 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill XVIII (Toronto, 1977), p.261. 
4 Of course, as Mill himself had political reasons for soft-pedalling his socialist commitments before 1848, perhaps 
Persky also thinks the modern political project of this book would be undermined by claiming Mill for socialism, 
not radicalism. This said, Persky’s stated desire is to speak to a modern radicalism informed by Marx as much as by 
Rawls (Persky, Political Economy, pp.xi-xx). 
In this article, I first lay out Persky’s view of ‘radicalism’, which I take to be a compelling one. 
Secondly, I turn to some specifics of his account of Mill’s ‘radicalism’, in particular considering his 
engagement with Mill’s ‘Socialism’, and to a broader consideration of Mill’s radicalism as a distinct 
species of socialism.  
 
1. RADICALISM. 
As noted above, a core strength of Persky’s contribution to Mill scholarship is his emphasis on 
Mill’s consistent radicalism, making sense of this not only in terms of Mill’s own development, but 
also via a better understanding of the radical milieu in which Mill was born and raised. It is also 
worth emphasising the nature of radicalism, which is a mind-set, or attitude towards the world, 
rather than a fixed ideology or set of proposals. In this way, it makes sense both to speak of Mill 
as consistently radical, and also of people as diverse in their views as Karl Marx and John Rawls as 
‘radicals’.  
Persky is not the first to link Mill with the radical tradition, but his intervention is illuminating as 
it is founded in (the history of) political economy, not political theory.5 Mill was both a ‘radical’ in 
an historical sense (being brought up to be the standard-bearer for a specific form of philosophic 
radicalism), and a ‘radical’ in a more expansive sense (being committed to root-and-branch reform 
of existing society, however incrementally, and – at least from the 1830s onwards – seeing existing 
institutions as ‘provisional’ and ‘transitional’, rather than set in stone). 
                                           
5 On Mill’s radicalism, and radical inheritance, see also Joseph Hamburger, Intellectuals in Politics: John Stuart Mill and the 
Philosophic Radicals (London, 1965); Gregory Claeys, Mill and Paternalism (Cambridge, 2013); Frederick Rosen, Mill 
(Oxford, 2013) and ‘From Jeremy Bentham’s radical philosophy to J.S. Mill’s philosophic radicalism’, The Cambridge 
History of Nineteenth Century Political Thought, ed. Gareth Steadman Jones and Gregory Claeys (Cambridge, 2011), 
pp.257-94; and Helen McCabe ‘“Under the General Designation of Socialist”: The Many-Sided-Radicalism of John 
Stuart Mill’ (D.Phil thesis, Oxford, 2010). 
In modern parlance, being ‘radical’ can be seen as a synonym for being ‘extreme’ in the content of 
one’s desires for reform and also in being ‘revolutionary’ and violent in the means (and speed) by 
which one thinks reform should be brought about. A proposal that we combat climate change 
through the immediate, violent overthrow of capitalism and a return to pre-industrial modes of 
production and political organisation might be called ‘radical’, whereas a proposal that 
governments use a combination of infrastructure funding, tax incentives, and regulation to ensure 
people only drive electric cars by 2030 might not be. But though we often overlook how ‘radical’ 
Mill’s ideas were in this sense6, this is not the most useful way of understanding ‘radicalism’, either 
historically or for the modern day.  
Instead, we should see radicalism as a particular attitude or mind-set. Radicals often support very 
different policy agendas, but they are united in a commitment and openness to root-and-branch 
reform. That is, a ‘radical’ approach to politics sees nothing as sacred – institutions, beliefs, 
practices – and thus, nothing is seen as worthy of preservation merely on the prima facie grounds 
that it already exists. Nor are arguments for something’s ‘naturalness’ or ‘inevitability’ (e.g. private 
property, gender, inequality, poverty) taken at face value, or as being synonymous with ‘good’. 
Radicalism, then, is always an iconoclastic challenge to the status quo. Not seeing Mill’s writing on 
property, poverty, equality, democracy, good government, liberty and gender-relations as ‘radical’, 
then, is to miss something vital in his outlook and proposals. As Persky rightly notes, this attitude 
                                           
6 Some of Mill’s proposals were seen as ‘extreme’ by his contemporaries, and many would still mark a significant 
difference from our own institutions, for instance, his proposals regarding property, inheritance, and workplace 
organisation. In contrast to this stereotypical view of ‘radicalism’, Mill was generally anti-revolutionary, though even 
this is more complex and nuanced than usually thought –see McCabe, “‘All of “liberty, equality and fraternity”, 
which is capable of being realised’: John Stuart Mill on ‘legitimate socialism’ and the 1848 revolutions in Paris”, Revue 
Philosophique do la France et de l’Etranger (forthcoming). 
is particularly evident in Mill’s writing on property and capitalism.7 Mill saw both property and 
laissez-faire capitalism as ‘provisional’8, and thus his endorsement of capitalism (where he makes it 
at all) is necessarily temporary.9  
Persky’s key focus is on Mill’s radical political economy. However, a key strength of The Political 
Economy of Progress is how Persky ties Mill’s view of contemporary institutions as ‘provisional’ and 
‘temporary’ to his philosophy of history. In particular, Persky’s work is illuminating as to how Mill 
not only saw technological and economic progress as being conditioned by, and dependent on, the 
level of knowledge in a society, but also on more normative elements, such as people’s underlying 
concepts of justice.10 Others have also engaged with how Mill adopted Comte’s tri-partite view of 
                                           
7 Persky, Political Economy, pp.72-151.  
8 Mill, Autobiography, p.239. Here, as in other areas of the book, the arguments of Political Economy could be usefully 
bolstered by reference to the Autobiography.  
9 Persky, Political Economy, pp.72-148. 
10 Persky, Political Economy., p.158. Persky says Mill adopted Condorcet’s ‘viewpoint’, seeing ‘the long story of history 
as one of progress’, and also adopted Comte’s ‘fundamental explanation for that progress as pivoting on periods of 
intellectual speculation’ (or, in the Saint-Simonian phrase, critical ages). Although acknowledging that Marx ‘was…a 
materialist’, Persky goes on to argue that ‘the materialist view is not that different from that of Mill’s’: ‘[a]t first 
glance, Mill seems to have endorsed an idealistic notion of progress. But his theory might reasonably be described 
from a Marxist view as incomplete, rather than wrong’; this is because ‘Mill gives us little or no clue as to the 
explanation for the period of widened intellectual speculation…However, a hypothesis along these lines might be 
drawn from Marx’ (Persky, Political Economy, p.158). I agree that it might be. And if Persky’s point is to persuade 
Marxists that Mill’s view of history is merely ‘deficient’ rather than ‘wrong’, and Marxists can embrace him as a 
fellow-radical, then maybe this a warranted reading of Mill’s view. But, in terms of both Mill and Marx’s own 
understanding of their views, I think there are significant differences, which may not be rooted so much in a 
distinction between materialism and idealism, but in whether or not they adopt a dialectical approach. (This is also 
the root of my disagreement with Persky over whether Mill has a Marxist conception of alienation and species-being, 
though I agree he was very critical of the current working conditions of labourers.)  
history (moving from the theological stage into the metaphysical, and finally to the positive, stage), 
and charted the impact of the Saint-Simonian view of history moving between ‘organic’ and 
‘critical’ ages11, but Persky’s account is particularly interesting because he focuses on the moral 
element of Mill’s philosophy of history. He brings to the fore Mill’s Auguste Comte and Positivism, 
where Mill expresses the hope that people would ‘develop a more moral and social view 
of…work’.12 Persky reminds us that Mill felt: 
 
Comte created an idea of ‘great beauty and grandeur’ when he ‘encouraged 
us ‘to regard working for the benefit of others as a good in itself…[W]e 
should desire it for its own sake, and not for the sake of remuneration, 
which cannot justly be claimed for doing what we like: that the proper 
return for a service to society is the gratitude of society’.13 
 
To this ‘opinion’, Mill added, ‘we entirely subscribe’.14 
This links with a further useful insight presented by Persky, into Mill’s view of ‘the progress of 
justice’.15 One element of Mill’s radical outlook, on this view, is that he saw even contemporary 
                                           
11 The two views are connected, and when Mill first came into contact with Comte, Comte was identifying himself 
with the Saint-Simonians. 
12 Persky, Political Economy, p.98. 
13 Persky, Political Economy., citing Mill (himself parsing Comte) in Auguste Comte and Positivism, CW X (Toronto, 1969), 
pp.341-2. Persky references the 1866 (N. Trubner, London) edition: the CW edition gives 1865 as the date for first 
publication, as two articles in Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review, with the Trubner edition being the first time 
they were published tougher as one manuscript. 
14 Persky, Political Economy, p.98, citing Mill, Auguste Comte, p.342.  
15 See Persky, Political Economy, pp.207-14. 
notions of justice as ‘provisional’. That is, Mill had a non-provisional commitment to the idea that 
‘[t]he equal claim of everybody to happiness…involves an equal claim to all the means of 
happiness’, but a more ‘provisional’ view as to what this entailed in different periods of history, 
adding to this commitment to proviso, ‘in so far as the inevitable conditions of human life, and 
the general interest, in which that of every individual is included, set limits to the maxim’.16 Still, 
though recognising ‘social limits on egalitarianism’, Persky rightly points out, ‘the key Millean 
utilitarian insight into justice is that those social limits are themselves historical entities, subject to 
material and social progress. They are matters of “expediency” [in Mill’s terminology] and not of 
principle’.17 Expediency ‘is conditional on historically changing conditions’, but equality remains 
‘objectively’ just, even if not achievable.18 As Mill puts it, ‘all social inequalities which have ceased 
to be considered expedient, assume the character not of simply inexpediency, but of injustice, and 
appear so tyrannical that people are apt to wonder how they ever could have been tolerated’.19  
Persky rightly points out that Mill has in mind economic inequalities, not just legal ones.20 Mill uses 
the phrase ‘accident’ in several places to refer to the kind of unjustified inequalities he wants to see 
eradicated – e.g. ‘accident of birth’.21 Persky argues that Mill was a luck-egalitarian, seeing ‘Progress’ 
                                           
16 Mill, Utilitarianism, cited Persky, Political Economy, p.207. 
17 Persky, Political Economy, p.207. 
18 Persky, Political Economy. For more on the link between ‘real’ justice and achievability, see McCabe, ‘“Navigating by 
the North Star”: the role of the ‘ideal’ in J.S. Mill’s View of ‘utopian’ schemes and the possibilities of social 
transformation’, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/utilitas/article/navigating-by-the-north-star-the-
role-of-the-ideal-in-john-stuart-mills-view-of-utopian-schemes-and-the-possibilities-of-social-
transformation/C7C299E0208DFEE9543D61BC75FE96BA> (2019). 
19 Mill, Utilitarianism, cited Persky, Political Economy, p.208. 
20 Persky, Political Economy, p.208. 
21 Mill, Autobiography, p.239. 
as ‘allow[ing] a temporal ordering in the historical movement toward the taming of luck’.22 I agree 
that Mill saw ‘accident[s] of birth’ as being a form of luck which had no relevance to justice, and 
also that his critique of, for instance, the ‘aristocracies of colour, race, and sex’23 could be read as 
instances of ‘brute luck’ in modern luck-egalitarian parlance. Moreover, one might see Mill’s 
critiques of ‘proportioning of remuneration to work done’, even if currently ‘highly expedient’ as 
luck-egalitarian because he writes that such proportioning is: 
 
really just, only in so far as the more or less of the work is a matter of 
choice: when it depends on natural difference of strength or capacity, this 
principle of remuneration is in itself an injustice: it is giving to those who 
have; assigning most to those who are already most favoured by nature.24 
 
That is, one might read this passage as suggesting that option luck is an acceptable basis for 
inequality of outcome/remuneration, but not brute luck. Still, I am not convinced that luck-
egalitarianism is the best view of Mill’s egalitarianism. In the main this is because I think there is 
something more relational in Mill’s account of justice and equality, as the line about our 
motivations for working which Persky himself cites (see above) shows.25 This said, it is both 
important, and one of the many virtues of Persky’s book, that he details and emphasises Mill’s 
commitment to egalitarianism, and shows its consistency throughout Mill’s life (sometimes masked 
                                           
22 Persky, Political Economy, p.209. 
23 Mill, Utilitarianism, cited Persky, Political Economy, p.208. 
24 Mill, Principles of Political Economy, CW II (Toronto, 1963), p.210. 
25 For more on this, see the article by Piers Norris Turner in this issue. 
by his differentiation between the just and the expedient), having its roots in Bentham’s 
utilitarianism.26 
Mill’s radicalism, then, both entailed a view that contemporary notions of justice might be 
‘provisional’ (though expedient), and a deep-rooted egalitarianism.27 This, in turn, entailed a 
commitment to root-and-branch reform, and comprehensive transformation, of existing social, 
political and economic institutions, including to property, class-relations, gender-relations, working 
conditions, political institutions, the law, religion, the family, and education (among others). Mill’s 
view of what was achievable – and desirable – in terms both of contemporary reform and the 
possibilities of human society, changed over his lifetime in response to contemporary economic, 
political and intellectual ideas and reforms.28 Most obviously, as he charts in his Autobiography, he 
started life as a committed Benthamite ‘philosophic-radical’; lost some of this faith during his 
mental ‘crisis’, exploring other forms of radicalism (including what might seem like an oxymoron 
– conservative radicalism, associated with Carlyle and Coleridge); and finally became, as he puts it, 
‘under the general designation of Socialist’.29  
Persky does not use this term for Mill’s radicalism, separating out the question of ‘socialism’ from 
that of Mill’s radical political economy of progress; acknowledging only that ‘towards the end of 
his life he moved toward a cautious socialism’30; and treating the issue of Mill’s socialism in a short 
                                           
26 See Persky, Political Economy, pp.26-42. 
27 See also McCabe, ‘Navigating by the North Star’. 
28 See McCabe, ‘Navigating by the North Star’. 
29 Mill, Autobiography, p.239. 
30 Persky, Political Economy, p.75. In conversation at the PPE Society Conference, Persky was generous in 
acknowledging that, as he did not mean only that Mill moved towards socialism around the time of writing Chapters 
on Socialism, but during the period in which he wrote the first edition(s) of Principles, ‘towards the end of his life’ was 
perhaps a little mean (as Mill was hardly either old or approaching death at 42). 
‘note’ at the end of Part 2, after a discussion of ‘Cooperatives, Unions and Economic Democracy’31, 
the first and last of which are core elements of Mill’s socialism32. He does say Mill ‘viewed his 
endorsement of workers’ cooperative as a component, perhaps the chief component, of his 
socialism’, and that Mill ‘welcomed with the greatest pleasure and interest all socialistic 
experiments’ and ‘identifi[ed]…cooperatives with socialism’.33 Persky also rightly notes that Mill 
thought socialism could be brought into being incrementally and via the expansion of small-scale 
experiments as those proved feasible and desirable, rather than through violent, immediate, 
wholescale revolutionary action; and that Mill’s socialism was decentralised and involved 
‘competition’ of some kind between cooperatives, rather than being centrally planned; and was 
intended to come into being within the existing system of private property, transforming 
‘transitional’ capitalism from within.34 Moreover, he engages in detail in Part 3 (‘Echoes’) with 
Mill’s connection to and influence on Marx, the Fabians, and Rawls’ understanding of ‘liberal 
                                           
31 See Persky, Political Economy, pp.148-51. 
32 See, for instance, Bruce Baum, ‘J.S. Mill and Liberal Socialism’, J.S. Mill’s Political Thought: A Bicentennial Reassessment, 
ed. Nadia Urbinai an Alex Zakaras, (Cambridge, 2007), pp.98-123; ‘J.S. Mill on Freedom and Power’, Polity 31/2 
(1998), pp.187-216; and ‘J.S. Mill’s Conception of Economic Freedom’, History of Political Thought 20/3 (1999), 
pp.494-530; Claeys, Mill and Paternalism (Cambridge, 2013), pp.123-72; McCabe, ‘Mill and Socialism: A Reply to 
Capaldi’, The Tocqueville Review, 33/1 (2012), pp.145-64, ‘John Stuart Mill’s Analysis of Capitalism and the Road to 
Socialism’, A New Social Question: Capitalism, Socialism and Utopia, ed. Casey Harrison (Cambridge, 2015), pp.8-22; 
‘John Stuart Mill and Fourierism: ‘Association’, ‘Friendly Rivalry’ and Distributive Justice’, Global Intellectual History, 
4/1 (2018), pp.35-61, and ‘Navigating by the North Star’; and Wendy Sarvasy, ‘A Reconsideration of the 
Development and Structure of John Stuart Mill’s Socialism’, The Western Political Quarterly 38/2 (1985), pp.312-33 
and ‘J. S. Mill’s Theory of Democracy for a Period of Transition between Capitalism and Socialism’, Polity, 16/4 
(1984), pp.567-87. 
33 Persky, Political Economy, p.149.  
34 Persky, Political Economy, p.149.  
socialism’, making socialism a core element of the book.35 Lastly, Persky provides an interesting 
engagement with the question of whether Mill might have approved of European (and particularly 
Scandinavian) social democracy.36 Still, he does not identify Mill’s radical political economy with 
socialism.  
Because of this, I will focus on Mill and socialism (and Mill’s socialism) in the rest of this piece, an 
important element of understanding which is to recognise as part of his utilitarianism, his 
                                           
35 A real strength of the book is the section in ‘Echoes’ on the similarity between Marx and Mill’s economics (despite 
everything Marx does to deny it). Following Cohen, Persky convincingly traces Marx’s ‘wilful misreading’ of Mill on 
the laws of production and distribution; Mill’s Ricardian labour theory of value; and their similar views regarding the 
falling rate of profit and capitalist business cycles. He offers some very interesting suggestions regarding why Marx 
was so keen not only to deny there was any similarity in their thinking, but to denigrate Mill’s thinking entirely. One, 
that it was because Mill’s analysis was so close to Marx’s own, which often put Marx on the attack. Two, because 
Marx sees Mill as bourgeois, and wants to show bourgeois intellectualism as a ‘revolutionary’ force is spent. Three, 
because he sees Mill as endorsing a cooperative form of socialism with which Marx fundamentally disagrees. In this 
case, the annoyance both seems to be that Mill is not ‘of’ the proletariat, and that Mill, in endorsing cooperation, is 
either wittingly or unwittingly merely furthering his own class interest in maintaining capitalism. 
36 Persky, Political Economy, p.153. Persky’s view is that Mill would have preferred social democracy of this kind to 
‘more traditionally-Marxist centrally-planned states’. For further support, Persky might point to the long sections in 
Principles where Mill justifies government – and particularly local-government – interventions in the market, as well 
as his nuanced position on state-funded, and state-provided, education. Even so, Persky is right to note that 
‘Government could be supportive’ of this transition, ‘in a number of ways, but is neither the centre of the effort nor 
the driving force’ because ‘Mill asserted that the freedom achieved and expanded through the political process is 
sufficient to begin a new transformation of the economy and society from the bottom up’ (Persky, Political Economy, 
p.74). Moreover, the reasons why Mill is cautious of governmental action in the economy, and supports cooperative 
socialism, which are grounded in concerns around independence, self-reliance (cooperation was called by many 
campaigners, including George Jacob Holyoake, whom Mill knew quite well, ‘self-help’) and the working classes, in 
particular, taking responsibility for themselves and their well-being, signal that we ought to be cautious in thinking 
he would embrace European-style welfare states. 
fundamental commitment to egalitarianism (and the ‘provisional’ nature of expediency), and to 
progress, as well as to ‘the free development of individuality’ (while also noting the fundamental 
reforms of the economy and particularly the workplace that that commitment led him to endorse).37 
It also necessitates further engagement with Mill’s commitment to ‘fraternity’ or harmony, hinted 
at in the passages from Comte quoted by Persky. This forms an important element not only of 
Mill’s political and social account of how society will sustainable, peacefully and spontaneously 
transform into socialism, but also of his (political-)economic account, explaining, as it does, how 
people will be motivated to work in, as well as for, a socialist future. 
 
2. SOCIALISM.  
Persky rightly emphasises that Mill saw laissez-faire capitalism as ‘a transitional stage in social 
evolution’ rather than ‘as the final achievement of progress’.38 This helpfully challenges most 
preconceived notions of Mill as a ‘classical’ laissez-faire liberal in economics and in politics.39 Central 
to this view of capitalism was an underlying view of private property as similarly ‘transitional’.40 
Mill’s normative critique of capitalism arises from his egalitarianism – a critique which developed 
over his lifetime (as, in his youth, he saw institutions we would now consider ‘capitalist’, plus some 
                                           
37 For much more on these (and harmony) being the essential elements of Mill’s mature ‘radicalism’, see McCabe, ‘The 
Many-Sided Radicalism of Mill’.  
38 Persky, Political Economy, p.74. 
39 Or, as William Stafford puts it, as a ‘paradigmatic liberal’ in both politics and economics – Stafford, ‘How can a 
Paradigmatic Liberal Call Himself a Socialist? The Case of John Stuart Mill’ Journal of Political Ideologies 3/3 (1998), 
pp.325-45. 
40 For Persky’s excellent account of utilitarian views regarding property, and how Mill adopted, and adapted, them, 
see Persky, Political Economy, pp.55-71. On the ‘transitional’ nature of capitalism, see also McCabe ‘Mill’s Analysis of 
Capitalism and the Road to Socialism’, pp.8-22 and ‘Navigating by the North Star’. 
not-traditionally-capitalist taxation practices, mainly on inheritance, as the last word in social 
reform).41 A core element of his critique of capitalism was a normative critique of class structures 
and interaction as unfair, unjust, and bad for utility. Mill complained that the current unjust 
structures did not reward workers fairly for their labour. ‘[T]he produce of labour’, ‘as we now see 
it’ was: 
 
apportioned…almost in an inverse ratio to the labour – the largest 
portions to those who have never worked at all, the next largest to those 
whose work is almost nominal, and so in a descending scale, the 
remuneration dwindling as the work grows harder and more disagreeable, 
until the most fatiguing and exhausting bodily labour cannot count with 
certainty on being able to earn even the necessaries of life.42 
 
As noted above, ‘accidents of birth’ led to people receiving unfair shares in the product of labour 
generated by all the workers in society. Moreover, the economic system both exacerbated these 
‘accidents’ (e.g. people who inherit capital in a capitalist system do better, such that ‘the rule that 
they who do not work shall not eat’ is only applied ‘the paupers’ instead of ‘impartially to all’43), 
and structured rewards in a non-ideal fashion. Mill writes, ‘[t]he rough method of settling the 
labourer’s share of the produce by the competition of the market, may represent a practical 
necessity, but certainly not a moral ideal’.44 ‘Its defence’, he continues, ‘that civilisation has not 
                                           
41 Persky, Political Economy, pp.55-109. 
42 Mill, Principles, p.207. 
43 Mill, Autobiography, p.239. 
44 Mill, Comte, p.341. 
hitherto been equal to organising anything better than this first rude approach to an equitable 
distribution…in no way affect[s]’ ‘the true moral and social idea of Labour’.45  
What is more, ‘[p]rivate property’, Mill writes, ‘in every defence made of it, is supposed to mean, 
the guarantee to individuals of the fruits of their own labour and abstinence’.46 Though this is not 
the same as a guarantee of equality, Mill calls it ‘an equitable principle’ of ‘proportion between 
remuneration and exertion’, whereby the more the extortion, the higher the share of the product 
of that exertion. This does not lead to equality of outcome, and elsewhere – as noted – Mill 
criticises this as not being ‘really just’ where – at least – the difference in work done is caused by 
superior strength or talent, rather than choice. But it is an egalitarian principle (even if a rough 
one), whereby equal exertion should result in equal reward.  
Mill expressly notes ‘[t]hat all should indeed start on perfectly equal terms, is inconsistent with any 
law of private property’ – that is, this system cannot result in equality of outcome (nor, therefore, 
equality of starting position for the next generation, if we allow any kinds of inheritance of 
property). But, he says, respect for the guarantee of the fruit of one’s own labour might approximate 
justice, or as much justice as it is currently possible to attain, given the contemporary moral state 
of humanity.47  
However, contemporary capitalism cannot even claim this much. Firstly, because under 
contemporary capitalism, many people do not receive the fruit of their own labours, while others 
receive ‘the fruits of the labour and abstinence of others, transmitted to them without any merit 
or exertion of their own’, which ‘is not of the essence of the institution, but a mere incidental 
consequence, which, when it reaches a certain height, does not promote, but conflicts with, the 
                                           
45 Mill, Comte, p.341. 
46 Mill, Principles, p.208. 
47 Mill, Principles, pp.207-8. 
ends which render private property legitimate’.48 That is, it ‘conflicts with’ an ‘equitable principle, 
or proportion between remuneration and exertion, on which in every vindication of it [i.e. private 
property] that will bear the light, it is assumed to be grounded’.49 This ‘equitable proportion’ is not 
only not ensured by contemporary capitalism, but basically turned on its head, with ‘the produce 
of labour…apportioned…almost in an inverse ratio to the labour’ done.50 
Secondly, contemporary capitalism is not a system founded in order to achieve this kind of justice. 
Rather, that is, than being ‘the result…of just partition, or acquisition by industry’, current 
property-holding (and property law) is the outcome ‘of conquest and violence: and 
notwithstanding what industry has been doing for many centuries to modify the work of force, the 
system still retains many and large traces of its origin’.51 Property has been allowed in ‘things which 
never ought to be property’.52 Property laws ‘have not held the balance fairly between human 
beings, but have heaped impediments upon some, to give advantage to overs; they have purposely 
fostered inequalities, and prevented all from starting fair in the race’.53 Rather than ameliorate, 
existing capitalist institutions ‘aggravate the inequality of chances arising from the natural working 
of the principle [of private property]’.54 Legislation has tended to ‘the concentration of wealth’ 
rather than its ‘diffusion’.55  
                                           
48 Mill, Principles, p.208. 
49 Mill, Principles, p.208. 
50 Mill, Principles, p.207. 
51 Mill, Principles, p.207. 
52 Mill, Principles, p.207. 
53 Mill, Principles, p.207.  
54 Mill, Principles, p.207. 
55 Mill, Principles, p.207. 
In Chapters on Socialism, Mill furthers this position, noting that even if the ‘race’ in which capitalism 
makes people run was, in itself, fair, and people had indeed started from the same position, it is 
not true ‘that…no one has any reason to complain’ that the ‘race’ provides the vast majority of 
workers with their ‘daily bread’, for it gives them nothing but their ‘daily bread…and that often in 
insufficient quantity; almost always of inferior quality; and with no assurance of continuing to have 
it at all’.56 He responds to those who say this is fair because ‘this hard lot…befalls only those who 
are outstripped by others, from inferiority of energy or prudence’57 firstly by questioning if this is 
indeed true (given, as he has just noted, that this applies to almost all working people), and secondly 
by saying: 
 
This, even were it true, would be a very small alleviation of the evil. If 
some Nero or Domitian were to require a hundred persons to run a race 
for their lives, on condition that the fifty or twenty who came in 
hindermost should be put to death, it would not be any diminution of the 
injustice that the strongest or nimblest would…escape. The misery and 
the crime would be that any were put to death at all. So in the economy of 
society; if there be any who suffer physical privation or moral degradation, 
whose bodily necessities are either not satisfied or satisfied in a manner 
which only brutish creatures can be content with, this, though not 
necessarily the crime of society is pro tanto a failure of the social 
arrangements.58  
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He adds, ‘to assert as a mitigation of the evil than those who thus suffer are the weaker members 
of the community, morally or physically, is to add insult to misfortune.’59 On the one hand, his 
reasoning for this is in line with a traditional utilitarian desire to minimise suffering as one way of 
maximising happiness (understood as more pleasure over pain over time), and perhaps even 
reveals something of a paternalistic attitude towards those who suffer: ‘[i]s weakness a justification 
for suffering? Is it not, on the contrary, an irresistible claim upon every human being for protection 
against suffering?’60 
But the concern with insulting the ‘weak’ reveals more of a relational egalitarian position.61 
Moreover, Mill recognises that inequality remains unchallenged because people refuse to 
acknowledge relationships with others, or that people as remote from capitalists as workers might 
be owed the same sort of duties of justice as their own family. He asks, ‘[i]f the minds and feelings 
of the prosperous were in a right state, would they accept their prosperity if for the sake of it even 
one person near them was, for any other cause than voluntary fault, excluded from obtaining a 
desirable existence?’62 (Though here, too, the idea of ‘voluntary fault’ links to luck-egalitarianism.) 
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61 C.f. Elizabeth Anderson, 'What Is the Point of Equality?', Ethics 109, (1999), pp.287–337. Though her argument – 
obviously – is against a Dworkinian form of inequality, and how she thinks the justification of such inequalities as 
he allows would be expressed to the least well-off, the point is applicable in the case outlined by Mill, where people 
are also justifying inequalities (though not of a Dworkinian nature), and in so doing adding insult to the injury already 
experienced by the people who – in the main – exert themselves most under, but receive the least from, capitalism.  
62 Mill, Chapters, p.713. Here, rather than Anderson, he pre-figures, perhaps, more of a Cohenite concern with the ethos 
of justice (see G.A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (London, 2008)). In this sense, there is a connection to Marx’s 
concept of alienated relations between people under capitalism, though I disagree with Persky’s claim that Mill has a 
similar concept of species being to Marx (Persky, Political Economy, p.157). 
Overall, then, Mill makes multiple critiques of capitalism on egalitarian grounds, several of which 
– as he notes – echo the critiques of contemporary socialists. As well as this, Mill also criticised 
capitalism on the grounds of liberty. For instance, he writes: 
 
‘[t]he generality of labourers…have as little choice of occupation or 
freedom of locomotion, are practically as dependent on fixed rules 
and on the will of others, as they could be on any system short of 
actual slavery, to say nothing of the entire domestic subjection of 
one half the species’.63  
 
He also endorsed more of contemporary socialist critiques of the efficiency of capitalism than one 
usually thinks, as well as criticising contemporary ideas of ‘laissez-faire’.64  
Mill’s answer to many of these criticisms of capitalism – and what he called his ‘Utopia’ in 1845 – 
was to ‘heal the widening breach between those who toil and those who live on the produce of 
former toil’ by ‘raising the labourer from a mere receiver of hire – a mere bought instrument in 
the work of production, having no residuary interest in the work itself – to the position of being, 
in some sort, a partner in it’.65 In 1845, he only speaks of profit-sharing, which he also details in 
the first edition of Principles (1848). In later editions, however (and in other relevant essays on 
economics), Mill endorses cooperation.66 And, in Mill’s period, cooperation was synonymous with, 
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and was an extremely influential and famous form of, socialism – was, in fact, ‘the most important 
aspect of socialism’ in the period, for socialists were active in co-operative societies; socialists 
advocated co-operation; and co-operative societies declared their socialism.67 
Others have charted the political-philosophical reasons Mill gives in Principles for endorsing 
cooperation: as Baum argues, it is Mill’s attempt to democratise the economy, and transfer into 
people’s working lives his deeply-held beliefs regarding freedom which are otherwise found in 
Liberty. (This is one reason it is no surprise we find passages almost identical to Liberty in Principles, 
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specifically as an Owenite. I am not sure this is borne out in her work (it is Mill, after all, not Taylor, who cites Owen 
in their first pair of essays, both titled On Marriage – Mill, On Marriage, CW XXI (Toronto, 1984), pp.48-9 – and Mill, 
as Persky notes, had a knowledge of, and engagement with, Owenites for almost twenty years before he met Taylor). 
Moreover, although Mill did endorse a form of cooperation, this was not a specifically Owenite form, but very much 
influenced by French thought, from Saint-Simon through to Louis Blanc. The Saint-Simonians Mill met before he 
met Taylor (as Persky rightly notes), but – again, contrary to thinking of her as an Owenite – Mill credits her with 
bringing home to him the truth of several elements of Saint-Simonism, not least the central (for Persky’s argument) 
difference between the laws of production and of distribution. Similarly, Persky describes as ‘generous’ Mill’s 
crediting of Taylor with co-authoring at least one key chapter of Principles, which seems to cast aspersions on the 
accuracy of Mill’s claim (which there are not very good grounds for doing). Yet this ignores both the afore-
mentioned importance of the distinction between production and distribution; Mill’s account of how she affected 
the ‘tone’ of Principles, even if not affecting the ‘scientific’ element; also the fact that Mill emphasised that it was 
Taylor who expressed the ‘two opposite theories respecting the proper condition of the labouring classes’ (Mill, 
Autobiography, p.255), of dependence and independence, all of which are central to Persky’s own account of Mill’s 
radicalism. Similarly, Persky says we can ‘presume’ that ‘not a few of’ the ‘discussions’ Mill mentions regarding ‘the 
best Socialistic writers on the Continent’ ‘were with Harriet Taylor’, yet we don’t need to merely ‘presume’ this, as we 
have surviving correspondence where they ‘discuss’ and ‘mediate’ on precisely that (see Appendix G to Principles, 
pp.1026-37). 
67 Iorwerth Prothero, Radical Artisans in England and France, 1830-1870 (Cambridge, 1997), p.145. 
first written a decade before.68) Persky’s economic exposition of how Mill foresaw the transition 
to cooperation is a welcome addition to the usual, more political, account. In particular, it makes 
Mill’s account of the possible transition to cooperative socialism in Principles seem more predictive 
than normatively prescriptive, or merely expressing a preference. 
Persky links Mill’s account of the transition to a cooperative (socialist) future with an excellent 
account of Mill’s ideas regarding ‘the stationary state’, or a state of no further growth, brought 
about by falling rates of profit (eventually to nothing).69 He argues that: 
 
As savings accumulated, as profit rates fell, as the economy moved toward 
the stationary state, Mill anticipated the reconstruction of the workplace— 
from a locus of mind- deadening exploitation to a rational and democratic 
institution well fitted for free, educated workers. Such a transition was at 
the very heart of Mill’s radical conception of progress.70 
 
Recognising Mill’s belief in the likelihood of the economy approaching a stationary state might 
help add weight to his assertion that part of the transition to cooperation will involve capitalists 
choosing to invest in cooperatives, and ultimately choosing to exchange their capital for annuities 
paid by the cooperatives, rather than asking for a return on their invested capital, and retaining 
rights of ownership over that capital. This helps explain how all capital, by an organic and 
spontaneous process, would become communally owned on Mill’s account, which in turn destroys 
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the current two-class system by getting rid of both privately-owned capital and inheritance.71 If the 
rate of profit across the entire economy is falling, then cooperatives may look like an increasingly 
good investment, at least compared to privately-owned firms. And perhaps, eventually, guaranteed 
annuities will look like better rewards for abstinence (which, as Persky rightly notes, Mill sees as 
the root cause of capital accumulations72) than any return one might otherwise get on an 
investment.73  
This said, I think it would be a mistake to think Mill thought cooperation would only come about 
in a stationary state, as this seems to delay the democratic transformation of the economy into a 
very ‘eventual’ state. But Mill thought cooperation was available to people right now (at least in 
industrialised countries) – it is other forms of socialism he casts as perhaps ‘the ultimate’ stage of 
human improvement74, and the stationary state, too, is something towards which we may 
inexorably be heading, but it is not something we are going to reach immediately.75 However, it is 
not clear that Persky is committed to thinking that a cooperative future will only arrive once we 
have reached the stationary state: perhaps moving towards one will aid the achievement of the 
other, and vice-versa.  
As others have noted, cooperation would transform workers’ lives (and utility) by allowing a much 
greater exercise, and development, of individuality in the workplace (and thus in a very substantial 
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part of people’s lives).76 It would also transform social relations, doing away with class distinctions, 
by eradicating the difference between owner and worker, ‘idle and industrious’77, capitalist and 
proletarian (to employ language Mill does not utilise). It would achieve the aim of Mill’s utopia, 
outlined above, making people ‘partners’ in work. Moreover, it would not merely make them 
‘partners’ with their employers (but not receiving an equal share of the product of their labour), 
but partners with their fellow-workers, democratically determining the division of the product of 
labour, and the rules and regulations by which their working days were governed.78  
Mill felt that such experiences of democracy at the day-to-day, immediate level, would form an 
excellent, and necessary, education in democracy both in the workplace and in national politics. 
This working experience, and particularly via the ability to determine, and live by, their own 
concepts of justice, was also important for generating the right kind of social sense, which in Comte 
and the Autobiography Mill likens to that felt in the military (‘in spite’, as he says, ‘of the anti-social 
character of its direct object’, i.e. war), where people are motivated – even to the extent of 
sacrificing their own self-interest and, indeed, life – not by the thought of personal reward or 
remuneration, but by comradeship and, particularly, patriotism.79 This Mill does not equate with 
nationalism (as the modern audience might) but with a care for one’s fellow citizens which allowed 
one to weigh their interests more heavily than one’s own, and to actually act in the greatest interest 
                                           
76 See, for instance, Baum, ‘Mill and Liberal Socialism’, pp.98-123; ‘Mill on Freedom and Power’, pp.187-216; and 
‘Mill’s Conception of Economic Freedom’, pp.494-530; Claeys, Mill and Paternalism, pp.123-72; and Sarvasy, 
‘Reconsideration of the Development and Structure of Mill’s Socialism’, pp.312-33 and ‘Mill’s Theory of 
Democracy’, pp.567-87. 
77 Mill, Autobiography, p.239. 
78 See Mill, Principles, pp.769-94. 
79 Mill, Comte, p.341; Mill, Autobiography, pp.239-41. 
of the greatest number (of which one made one part, but did not count for more than one, in true 
utilitarian fashion).  
This thought is linked to the fact that cooperatives could determine the principles of justice which 
they applied to the division of their own product of labour (and would be part of a transformation 
of society such that all the social product of labour ‘will be made by concert, on an acknowledge 
principle of justice’80). Mill records how, initially, producer cooperatives founded by Blanc adopted 
Blancian principles of distribution or equal shares, but quickly abandoned them for piecework, as 
not all the workers were motivated to work once they knew their share of the product was assured 
whether they worked or not, and their colleagues were not willing to see them take a share of the 
product without having contributed a fair share of the labour.81  
Mill’s discussion of forms of Socialism which allow for an unequal division of the product of 
labour (e.g. Saint-Simonism and Fourierism), and forms which insist on an equal division (which 
he calls ‘communism’, such as Owenism) provides some guide to the range of options he saw 
available to cooperatives.82 In turn, this helps us flesh out both Mill’s concept of equality, and the 
depth of his commitment to socialism.83  
As noted above, securing for the labourer the fruit of his or her own labour and abstinence has 
some claim to be ‘just’. It can lead to something like rough equality, if care is taken to temper 
private property’s general effect of tending towards accumulations of capital in fewer and fewer 
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hands.84 However, Mill mitigates this endorsement by saying this is only ‘expedient’ (even if ‘highly’ 
so) because it is the ‘compromise with the selfish type of character formed by the present standard 
of morality, and fostered by the existing social institutions’. Thus, ‘until education shall have been 
entirely regenerated, [it] is far more likely to prove immediately successful, than an attempt at a 
higher ideal’.85 This shows Mill did not think such a principle of justice was the ‘highest’ (or even, 
necessarily, the highest we could attain) – instead, it was currently ‘expedient’.86  
Earlier, Mill called ‘equal shares’ more just than the unequal ones (even ones ‘grounded on some 
principle, or supposed principle, of justice or general expediency, and not, like so many of the 
existing social inequalities, dependent on accident alone’) endorsed by Saint-Simon and Fourier. 
Then, he calls ‘from each according to his capacities, to each according to his wants’ (or needs), 
which he associates with Blanc, a ‘still higher’ principle of justice.  
Even this principle, then, might not be the ‘highest’ or ‘truest’ form of justice – it might still turn 
out only to be expedient when (if) a communist future in which we have implemented it dawns. 
But the ‘lesser’ principles are all ‘only’ species of expediency, and – as with all that is expedient – 
this expediency is rooted in specific social, historical, economic and political conditions, some of 
which we are already experiencing, some of which we are not.  
Referring back to Persky’s argument that we should see Mill as a luck-egalitarian, Mill certainly does 
want to overcome the injustice of luck, and indeed ‘from each according to his capacities, to each 
according to his needs’ is, in some sense, an extension of this: ‘from each according to his wants’ 
means our contributions can be meaningfully ‘equal’, no matter our talents (and the talented don’t 
get, for instance, more leisure time simply be virtue of getting things done more easily or quickly 
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than the less-talented), and ‘to each according to his needs’ both mitigates bad (brute) luck, and 
ensures that reward is not unjustly affected by good luck. But this principle does not justify 
inequalities via a concept of option luck, but – instead – ‘wants’ or needs. Moreover, Mill’s project 
is something even more than just mitigating against luck, important though he sees that to be. 
Because this Blancian (indeed, often thought of as Marxian) principle of justice is not just about 
luck. It is about a nuanced concept of equality, of both contributions and of outcomes. As also 
noted above, it is also about a certain form of social relationship, where we are motivated to 
contribute what we can by recognition of each other’s needs: ‘cash’ is no longer the ‘nexus’ of 
human relationships, but concern for each other’s needs. We do not see ‘our’ fair share of the 
product of labour as being necessarily related to our output, but as being related to our needs.  
Mill hints at this as an ideal future state, as Persky rightly notes when he emphasises how Mill felt 
‘[s]ociety was moving, however, slowly, toward a point where people would “regard working for 
the benefit of others as a good in itself”’ and ‘associated this progressive development with the 
unfolding of justice for the greater number’.87 But this is a socialist concept of justice, and a socialist 
concept of motivation and social relationships. Persky seems to pull back from this, saying ‘Mill 
was surely impressed by the achievements of market economics, and he hesitated at the more 
extreme claims of socialists’.88 This is true, in terms both of their critiques of current capitalism, 
and in terms of some of their ‘extreme’ recipes for reform (not least, wholescale revolution with 
not plan for future institutions). He evidently also held out some hope for a ‘perfected’ form of 
capitalism, in which inequalities were mitigated as much as was possible consistent with the basic 
functioning of private property, proving to be expedient and a plausible choice vis-à-vis 
communism (whose problems, serious though they might be, Mill says are ‘as dust in the balance’ 
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compared to the evils of contemporary capitalism89). But it is not true that Mill ‘hesitated’ when it 
comes to endorsing or recognising socialist principles of justice, except regarding when such 
principles would be not only just, but expedient – and that, as Mill sees it, is not quite yet, for 
people do not currently have sufficient moral education to allow them to be motivated in the right 
ways.  
Certainly, Mill ‘looked for the cooperative movement to play a transformative role in facilitating 
the material, intellectual and moral development of the working-classes’, but cooperation itself – 
or at least, cooperation as was successfully being practice in France and England at the time – was 
also transitional. It involved principles of justice which linked remuneration to effort, rather than 
the ‘higher’ principles of equality endorsed by Blanc. Indeed, as noted, Blanc’s National 
Workshops had experimented with equal shares, and found them (currently) infeasible, adopting, 
instead, systems of remuneration which more-closely linked remuneration to productivity. But 
these were early days of cooperation, and the society Mill sketches as ‘the nearest approach to 
social justice, and the most beneficial ordering of industrial affairs for the universal good, which it 
is possible at present to foresee’90 would be able to transcend these ‘selfish’ motivations and adopt 
‘still higher’ principles of justice, achieving even more than the eradication of the moral, and 
remunerative, significance of luck.  
As noted above, there is, for Mill, a strong connection between the ‘height’ of the principles of 
justice we can achieve, and the extent to which take seriously the moral claims of others. That is, 
for Mill, equality and fraternity are closely aligned. Indeed, of the 1848 revolution, and the 
establishment of National Workshops, Mill said it represented ‘all of “liberty, equality and 
fraternity” which is capable of being realised now, and…prepare[s] the way for all which can be 
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realised hereafter’.91 We see this in Mill’s writing about ending class rivalry, the ‘widening breach’ 
between people; his comments regarding the mindset of those who benefit from inequalities 
mentioned above; and in his writing in Comte about how we need to ‘regard working for the benefit 
of others as a good in itself, that we should desire it for its own sake, and not for the sake of 
remuneration’ seeing ‘that the moral claim of any one in regard to the provision for his personal 
wants, is not a question of quid pro quo in respect to his co-operation, but of how much the 
circumstances of society permit to be assigned to him, consistently with the just claims of others’.92  
This seems an important lacuna in Persky’s argument, which focuses almost solely on equality, but 
something which would add grist to Persky’s mill (pun intended). In particular, it helps show that 
Mill was not only about tinkering with some of the evident problems of capitalism, but about 
transforming it. It is not only the fundamental institutions of capitalism Mill sees as changing 
radically in the future (e.g. property, inheritance, wage markets), but the relationships between 
people, and their own psychological motivations. This is also a key part of how we will actually 
achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest number in the future – in part by being motivated 
much more to care about that, rather than always acting in our own interests, and careful 
institutional design organising these individually-interested actions into something which benefits 
the majority.  
Of course, this emphasis also makes Mill’s socialism clearer. He did have economic reasons for 
supporting socialism, as well as arguments founded in egalitarianism and liberty. But he also had 
‘fraternal’ reasons for advocating for socialism, and saw something important changing, under 
socialism, in the quality and organisation of human relationships. Cooperation was one key mode 
by which such qualitative change could be brought about. 
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One challenge to this thought might be Mill’s evident concern with freedom and ‘individuality’, 
most obviously in On Liberty. But though Mill evidently recognised that communism (in particular) 
might create a ‘tyrannical yoke’ of public opinion and a society in which ‘the absolute dependence 
of each on all, and surveillance of each by all, might ‘grind all down into a tame uniformity of 
thoughts, feelings, and actions’93, he did not see socialism as being necessarily inconsistent with 
‘the free development of individuality’.94 In the Autobiography, he writes: 
 
While we repudiated with the greatest energy the tyranny of society over 
the individual, we yet looked forward to a time…when it should no longer 
either be, or be thought to be, impossible for human beings to exert 
themselves strenuously for benefits which were not to be exclusively their 
own, but to be shared with the society they belong to.95  
 
That is, if ‘the minds and feelings’ of everyone (not just the prosperous) ‘were in the right state’, 
people ought to be able to freely develop their individuality, but they should also be able to be 
motivated by concern over the interests of others, and work hard for benefits they will share (where 
this ‘share’, on an individual level, might also be quite small). This, evidently, was what Mill believed 
socialism might achieve, in his preferred form, and the two things (plus more distributive justice), 
were not mutually incompatible.96 
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After all, the harm principle is aimed at protecting as wide a sphere of liberty as possible for 
people’s self-regarding actions. Having such freedom is not in itself incompatible with fraternal 
feelings, particularly in a society which adopts the view expressed by the harm principle – that 
people should be left free to do as they see best so long as they are not causing harm to others. 
Mill recognises that a socialist society might not hold such a view – but he does not think it 
impossible that a socialist society could adopt this view. 
Thus, the harm principle would not be, itself, ‘provisional’, and would still have salience in a 
socialist society. This said, some of the instances of potential harm-causing which Mill thinks ought 
to be permitted, on balance, in Liberty, might not exist in a society motivated by fraternity. For 
instance, Mill notes that some ‘damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others’ is 
caused ‘necessarily and therefore legitimately’ by individuals ‘pursuing a legitimate object’.97 
Expediency requires that we allow such cases in contemporary society, and the harm principle is 
not designed to prohibit them. However, Mill notes, ‘[s]uch oppositions of interest between 
individuals often arise from bad social institutions’, which might well be eradicated in a socialist 
future.98  
Similarly, the harm principle allows for the coercion of people whose inaction is causing harm – 
Mill gives examples where we can rightfully compel action, including ‘to give evidence in a court 
of justice, to bear [our] fair share in the common defence…and to perform certain acts of 
individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow-creature’s life, or interposing to protect to 
defenceless against ill usage’.99 If people were motivated by a due concern for other people’s 
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interests, and did not discount them in comparison to much less weighty interests of their own, 
then these inactions would be less frequent (as might be the ill usage which we ought to protect 
others from in the first place). That is, more fraternal, more moral, motivations, might make the 
harm principle obsolete, at least in some areas. Thus, this improved social feeling might actually 
lessen coercion, even in a society only justifying coercion on the grounds of the harm principle. 
There is certainly a tension to be further explored in Mill’s writing regarding the positive role he 
accords to public opinion (for instance, he sees the power of public opinion in communist societies 
to limit family size as a ‘recommendation’ of that scheme100) and his mistrust of its power, and 
desire to protect people from it, in Liberty (and Principles). It seems Mill thought public opinion 
could be harnessed to help achieve beneficial outcomes (e.g. controlling population size), even 
when we also needed to ensure that – in areas where its interference was not beneficial, of which, 
of course, he did not think the question of family-size was one101 – it also needed to be protected 
against. And as the moral education of society continued, perhaps also people would recognise 
where pressure from public opinion was legitimate, and where not, internalising the essence of the 
harm principle. That is, Mill’s preferred socialist future would be one in which people did indeed 
‘fe[el] that the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of wellbeing: that 
it is not only a co-ordinate element with all that is designated by the terms civilisation, instruction, 
education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of all those things’, as well as being 
capable of much more fellow-feeling than Mill currently diagnosed in society.102 Indeed, as noted 
above, his preferred form of socialism involved ‘all of “liberty, equality and fraternity” which is 
capable of being realised now, and…prepare[s] the way for all which can be realised hereafter’.103 
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All-in-all, then, a socialism which was committed to equality and fraternity and also to Mill’s idea 
of ‘the free development of individuality’ might not only be Mill’s ‘utopia’, but be one which would 
attain the Marxist goal of a society in which ‘the free development of each is the condition for the 
free development of all’ as well as embodying the ideal of ‘from each according to his capacities, 
to each according to his needs’.104  
 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, in Political Economy, Persky makes a significant and important contribution to thinking 
about Mill’s political programme, and to bringing his political economy into a more central position 
in our understanding of that programme; Mill’s oeuvre as a whole; and the focus of most Mill 
scholarship. He extends our understanding of Mill’s radical political economy in important ways, 
and opens up several new lines of inquiry regarding Mill and Marx; Mill and Rawls; Mill and 
property-owning democracy; Mill and luck egalitarianism; Mill and liberal socialism; and Mill’s 
place in a ‘canon’ of modern radicalism, not all of which I have had time or space to engage with 
here. Emphasising Mill’s radicalism, from his radical inheritance through to his radical views on 
inheritance, helps us see the consistency of his views and political project. As I have argued above, 
however, this ‘radicalism’ was termed by Mill a species of ‘qualified Socialism’, and I think the 
socialist label ought to be used for it. This is not merely about labelling, though, but about 
understanding the depth and nuance of Mill’s radicalism, and particularly those elements central 
to Persky’s argument, concerning a radical egalitarianism; a commitment to restructuring work-
relations; and the view of capitalism and private property as only ‘transitional’ or ‘provisional’ 
institutions.  
                                           
104 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto in Marx and Engels: Collected Works 6 (London, 1976), 
p.506.  
Political Economy provides an excellent springboard for serious, scholarly reflection on Mill and 
Marx as radical, socialist, and classical political economists; and for seeing Mill as a resource for 
modern left-liberals looking beyond Rawls for ideas regarding property-owning democracy, liberal 
socialism, ‘market socialism’ and cooperation. This said, as one last word, I think there needs to 
be more serious attention played to Harriet Taylor – especially as this book is exemplary in its 
recognition of Helen Taylor – not least because Mill’s lived, as well as expressed, feminism was a 
core part of his radicalism (and one in which he is ahead of both Marx and Rawls). A ‘modern’ 
radicalism which is not feminist, and which does not recognise the legacy of women in its canon, 
cannot achieve the political outcomes Persky wants for radical politics in the modern day.105  
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